"We all have it in our hands to create trust"

Historian Georg Eckert on the history of democracy

Democracy is dying, says the industrialised world, because the system has not delivered what it promised. At the same time, you, together with Dr Thorsten Beigel, are publishing a book in which you describe the history of democracy from antiquity to the present day. So is there still hope of saving the patient after all?

Eckert: Democracy is alive. We can see that from the lively and controversial interpretation of its condition in all kinds of media - and from the fact that in this country, for example, people are allowed to express sympathy for the Russian president with impunity. The other way round is rather difficult. In fact, some crisis discourses are the best proof of how alive and kicking the ideal of popular rule is in our country. As long as people are arguing about how it should be organised, it has not yet been abandoned. And democracy also thrives on a certain optimism, especially in the face of major national and international challenges: namely the confidence that a free exchange of ideas has the greatest likelihood of finding good, lasting and, above all, acceptable solutions to a wide variety of problems. Nevertheless, we are concerned that in many places there is a growing willingness to entrust the future of the country to supposed authoritarian miracle workers. The task everywhere must be to counter this with good, namely well-made and well-founded policies.

In chapter 2 of your book, you pose the question: "Can the masses actually make decisions in their own best interests, and do they even know what their interests are?" Is the participation of everyone in political decision-making perhaps a problem of democracy?

Eckert: First of all, it is the exclusive democratic solution to many problems. Political participation by the people is a great guarantee that decisions will be supported rather than boycotted by a majority of the population - and that rulers will take into account what seems to move those to whom they owe their power. But the participation of all, which in view of very unequal voter turnout rates in different population groups is sometimes more of a postulate than a reality, also remains a challenge - and it is also the millennia-old standard objection to the principle of democracy: namely as a criticism of the capricious rule of the uneducated, which can already be found in ancient Athens. But to a certain extent, the concern about an emotion-driven "mob" was paradoxically itself an important democratisation factor, along with the idea that radical ideas could be tempered by parliaments and parties: The epochal expansions of the right to vote in the 19th and 20th centuries happened not least in consideration of the fact that the population might otherwise rise up in revolution. Very few people were enthusiastic about the people as sovereign, and most considered them notoriously unreasonable. The famous bon mot "Every nation gets the government it deserves" was coined by a man of the Ancien Régime, the French statesman and statesman Joseph de Maistre.

In your book, you present various forms of democracy throughout history. Which was the most convincing?

Eckert: The most convincing democratic systems are those that are well suited to the respective circumstances, because they give the participants the feeling that they are living in a familiar system of government and can really help shape politics. The small-scale direct democracy of Switzerland would be hard to imagine in a large state like the United States. Another rule of experience can also be derived: Democracies that are not able to secure the prosperity of at least an influential part of the population quickly come under pressure to legitimise themselves - such as the Weimar Republic, which admittedly could not possibly have solved the problems that led to its downfall. The Weimar example also provides a further indication. Stable democracies must be allowed to defend themselves; they have to put up with a lot, but not everything, from their enemies. Stable democracies can also be recognised by a litmus test, namely the question of whether changes of power take place peacefully. They do this where the defeated parties still have reason to hope that they will not be harassed and will regain power after another election.

You also devote a chapter to American democracy.
We are currently witnessing the ongoing presidential election between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump. Under the conditions of mass media, the "democratic" struggle for the highest office in the land is more like a mud-slinging battle between two parties that only see each other as enemies. How can trust be rebuilt?

Eckert: The logic of mass media also applies in other systems of government: Mudslinging occurs there too - only with incomparably more brutal consequences when opponents of the regime are sent to labour camps. Above all, one of the advantages of democracy is that conflicts can be dealt with openly; a dictator can hardly be criticised harshly, at least not for long. A certain amount of mutual accusations and insults is part of the deal: better mud-slinging than street battles. The former have a certain entertainment value; it only becomes problematic in excess. When social democrats in Wilhelmine Germany were attacked as "journeymen without a fatherland", hostility was the order of the day, and Gerhard Schröder's mockery of the "professor from Heidelberg" was hardly meant in a friendly way. In principle, however, the Anglo-American tradition is characterised by very robust election campaigns; in the 19th century, things were sometimes much tougher than they are today. In any case, the political systems in Great Britain and the United States are much more characterised by conflict than our German system, which is more consensual. However, what happens during the election campaign is less decisive than what happens after the election, namely the question of whether the election loser and their supporters recognise their defeat - and whether they find compromises in the event of opposing majorities. The storming of the White House after the last presidential election was a stress test for democracy, but it clearly passed it. A certain amount of trust can be drawn from this - as well as from the fact that victorious parties fulfil their promises after the election instead of making empty announcements and arguing amongst themselves. Even more than other forms of government, however, democracy is based on the experience that this system of government enables the population to lead as good and self-determined a life as possible. It is up to all of us to create trust: Professional politicians and voters alike. This cannot be imposed; rather, we all decide anew every day how we talk about politicians and politics.

You dedicate four chapters to democracy in the 20th century, which also experienced various ups and downs. Which of these would you see as particularly formative for us today?

Eckert: German history in particular shows - probably the most important lesson - the fragility of democracies. Democracy is not an inevitability of world history. The rule of the people can also fade again, so something has to be done to ensure that it remains. Democracy must grow, it cannot be created with the promulgation of a constitution - that is the second lesson: the smooth transfer of power in 1969 was perhaps more important in the history of German democracy than the promulgation of the Basic Law twenty years earlier. The West, on the other hand, experienced a brief euphoria about democracy after the end of the Cold War, but this quickly gave way to the realisation in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, that democracy also depends on conditions that it cannot guarantee itself (to paraphrase a famous dictum by the constitutional lawyer Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde). Whether a democracy develops and exists depends on many circumstances; democracy also includes a specific political culture that must develop. The third lesson could be the following: Perhaps the greatest virtue of democracy is that it is the only system of government in which this very system can be openly criticised and quickly changed by election. Although the regular change of power can also slow down reforms, it ensures a more frequent renewal of personnel than in other forms of government - and democracy has the largest reservoir of personnel, as everyone can vote and be elected.

Democracy around the world is under pressure. The policies of the established powers are also responsible for the global rise of right-wing parties. Can you explain that?

Eckert: Many Western democracies have been struggling to tackle major issues for some time now - and are faced with the problem that tried and tested models no longer work in our age as they once did. And as much as general criticism may be well-founded, parties are finding it difficult to recruit staff beyond established patterns. However, this is not worrying per se. After all, the fact that new parties are constantly forming to counter the established ones is virtually the lifeblood of democracy; there is no guarantee of eternity for political organisations. They are tied to specific interests and world views, and things change. In this country, the Greens were once a party that was decidedly against the "establishment", today they are virtually its epitome. When new parties are formed, this is usually associated with social change. This can hardly be stopped, but there are parties on both the left and the right that pretend to be: Populists of various colours who benefit from the fact that rapid socio-economic change has set in over the last few decades. It creates opportunities for some, but others perceive it with - by no means unjustified - fears of loss, which the corresponding parties know how to serve. In a world that seems increasingly uncertain, it is a logical reaction for people to refer to what they know well or think they know well: and that is not least their own nation, which promises at least some security and safety in a world without borders and with large migration flows. You have to take that seriously, whatever you think about it.

The state elections in Brandenburg are coming up on 22 September. The AfD is expected to achieve a high result. Why are the established parties no longer reaching voters?

Eckert: The reasons for an erosion of the voter base are complex, they lie in the parties themselves, in the political system, in social change - and also in the media. In social media, many established parties clearly have some catching up to do as well as structural problems. Twitter & Co. are not forums that favour balanced representations. But the problem lies deeper, because many people increasingly perceive the classic daily political announcements across all mass media as empty "political speak" - and that is perfectly understandable. Perhaps the established parties are also realising that they have sometimes created higher expectations of their players and the political system than was wise. No democracy can provide everyone with the life they would like to have at the same time, at least not a sustainable one. It is also an important mediation task to deal publicly with the fact that the usual growth rates and increasing prosperity over generations are not a sure-fire success: Thirty years ago, German presidents Richard von Weizsäcker and Roman Herzog appealed for more movement in the political system. That still sounds very topical.

What quintessence do you draw from the history of democracy that is worth continuing to support this form of government?

Eckert: If you look at the history of democracy since ancient Athens, at the rise and fall of different forms of popular rule, you arrive at a sober optimism. Winston Churchill, who had been forced to resign as Prime Minister two years earlier (as a recent victor of the Second World War, mind you) after losing a general election, made a still relevant point in a House of Commons debate in 1947: "Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time". We would be ill-advised to expect continued miracles from democracy. Popular rule is no guarantee of prosperity; even in democratic states there must be disputes over scarce collective resources and their allocation. But such communities offer the greatest opportunities for this to happen in the most civilised way possible and with the least possible discrimination against those who are not in the majority. This is probably a very central and at the same time very encouraging finding from analysing the history of democracy. Optimism is also fuelled by the observation that democracy can take on very different forms and often adapt so well to new circumstances precisely because it is able to integrate many perceptions and interests. The most promising form of popular rule is usually determined by circumstances that cannot usually be changed overnight.

Georg Eckert, Thorsten Beigel: History of Democracy. From antiquity to the present day. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2023; 30.00 euros.

Uwe Blass

Dr Georg Eckert studied history and philosophy in Tübingen, where he gained his doctorate with a study on the early Enlightenment around 1700 with a British focus, and habilitated in Wuppertal. He began working as a research assistant in history in 2009 and now teaches as a private lecturer in modern history.